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Parliamentary Immunity in 




This article examines the effect that shielding elected representatives from 
criminal law might have in those countries that are undergoing democra-
tization. Parliamentary immunity helps to compensate for any shortfall in 
the human rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens and provides elected repre-
sentatives with the protection necessary to rectify that shortfall. However, 
the immunity may also protect subversive advocacy, rights violations and 
political corruption. Turkey provides an illuminating case study of those 
challenges to parliamentary immunity. Drawing on the Turkish experience, 
it is argued that methods other than exposing parliamentarians to criminal 
prosecution should be used to counter those problems.
I. INTRoDUCTIoN
Historically, parliamentary immunity has been seen as an important demo-
cratic right because it protects the ability of elected assemblies to debate 
and vote without interference by nonelected authorities. However, it is 
not a right that is intended to protect parliamentarians themselves, but to 
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protect their ability to act on behalf of those whom they represent. In other 
words, it is a right which derives its legitimacy from the fundamental right 
of individuals to govern themselves. Thus, it is best seen as an extension of 
the democratic rights that enable individuals to actively participate in the 
process of democratic decision-making. This article considers the role that 
parliamentary immunity might play in those political communities where 
the civil and political liberties of ordinary citizens are not adequately pro-
tected. That is to say, this article examines the effect that shielding elected 
representatives from criminal law might have in those countries that are 
undergoing democratization. 
The problem posed by parliamentary immunity is that it provides the 
means both to undermine and to promote the process of democratization. 
On the one hand, the absence of the law may lead to unbridled particular-
ism on the part of elected representatives. On the other hand, exposure 
to the law may only serve to protect the vestiges of authoritarian rule. The 
concern in the first case is that in the absence of the threat of punishment, 
elected representatives may not be able to resist the temptation to pursue 
their particular interests, even when that pursuit would compromise their 
public duty (e.g. political corruption), cause a rights violation, or threaten 
the democratic order (e.g. supporting the installation of nondemocratic rule). 
The concern in the second case is that there is a greater need for immunity 
in those countries where democracy is emerging or consolidating because 
the existing body of law, or those who enforce the law, are typically the 
product of an authoritarian past. According to that view, authoritarian rule 
is self-perpetuating if elected representatives can be prosecuted for publicly 
questioning unelected institutions or attempting to bring those institutions 
under civilian control through legislation. Parliamentary immunity, then, 
enables a forum for unfettered communication when the civil and political 
rights in the polity at large are inadequately protected. Indeed, it makes pos-
sible the passage of legislation designed to ensure that those rights become 
adequately protected.
In what follows, this article examines the problem posed by parliamen-
tary immunity within the context of Turkey, a country that is in the process 
of consolidating its democratic status. Turkey provides us with a particularly 
illuminating case study of the problem for two reasons. First, although there 
have been regular and competitive elections since 1950, there is a prima facie 
case for parliamentary immunity because the military possesses a significant 
degree of influence over the decision-making of civilians, the judiciary is 
not sufficiently even-handed in its treatment of cases, and civil and political 
liberties are inadequately protected. Alternatively, there is a prima facie case 
for abrogating parliamentary immunity, because there is a widespread public 
perception that political corruption is rampant. Additionally, the military-led 
establishment is concerned that political parties representing the Kurdish or 
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Islamic vote will use democratic freedoms, such as parliamentary immunity, 
in order to secede from the Turkish state or impose an Islamic political order. 
As a result of these competing concerns, parliamentary immunity has become 
a prominent issue in a number of cases brought against the Turkish state in 
the European Court of Human Rights.1 Drawing on the Turkish experience, 
this article argues that democratizing countries should use other measures 
besides narrowing parliamentary immunity to counter problems such as 
political corruption, rights violations, and subversive advocacy.
II. THE FoRMAL STRUCTURE oF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY 
A key issue that informs the structure of parliamentary immunity is how widely 
it should be interpreted in order to adequately protect the public function of 
elected representatives. Is it sufficient to immunize the parliamentary speech, 
debate, and votes of representatives (“legislative agency”)? Or, should all of 
parliament’s other activities (“nonlegislative agency”) also be immune from 
legal scrutiny? Historically the world’s representative democracies have 
produced two ways of protecting the public function of parliamentarians. 
The first model only immunizes the legislative agency of representatives 
and is known as parliamentary non-accountability. The second model also 
immunizes legislative agency, but requires the assembly’s authorization be-
fore the nonlegislative agency of representatives can be legally questioned. 
This second model is known as parliamentary inviolability. The first model 
originates from Article 9 of the 1689 English Bill of Rights and has typically 
been adopted by those countries that were subject to British colonization.2 
The rest of the world’s democracies followed the French National Assembly’s 
coupling of parliamentary non-accountability with parliamentary inviolability 
in 1789 and have adopted the second model.3
According to parliamentary non-accountability, the legislative agency of 
each representative is unconditionally immune in the sense that it cannot 
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be legally questioned at any time, including after the representative has lost 
her parliamentary mandate. At a minimum, legislative agency includes each 
representative’s speech and votes made while in the assembly or parliamen-
tary committee. Typically, constituency work, speeches delivered outside 
parliament, press releases, and other similar activities are nonlegislative and, 
therefore, accountable to the law.4 By contrast, the parliamentary inviolabil-
ity approach makes the representative’s nonlegislative agency conditionally 
immune because it can only be legally questioned if parliament consents. 
However, parliamentary authorization is typically not required in civil cases, 
once a representative loses her mandate, or if she is caught flagrante delicto 
(“caught in the act”).5 In order to clarify the distinction between these two 
different kinds of immunity, consider the example of a person who deliv-
ers a speech that she knows will incite a riot. If an elected representative 
delivered such a speech to the assembly, non-accountability entails that 
she cannot be prosecuted at any time. Now consider the scenario in which 
she delivers the same speech to a political rally. If, in accordance with the 
English model, she is only protected by non-accountability then she can be 
prosecuted. If, in accordance with the French model, she is also protected 
by inviolability then she can only be prosecuted if she is caught red handed, 
parliament consents, or she loses her electoral mandate. 
Wesley Hohfeld’s classic analysis of the logic of rights provides a useful 
basis for further clarifying the formal character of parliamentary immunity.6 
If we interpret parliamentary non-accountability in terms of the Hohfeldian 
schema we can see that it is composed of a liberty-right, a claim-right, and 
an immunity-right. The representative has a liberty-right because she does 
not have a duty to refrain from performing a range of actions. In addition, 
she has a claim-right because others have a duty not to prevent her from 
performing those actions. This is coupled with the further claim-right that 
the state uses coercive force to prevent others from interfering in the perfor-
mance of those actions. Notice also that parliamentary immunity attaches to 
the representative’s public function, not to the representative herself. Thus, 
the representative does not have a Hohfeldian power to modify her right. 
A representative typically cannot voluntarily waive her non-accountability 
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protection (e.g. so as to clear her name of a false accusation in a court of 
law). Similarly, parliament or another government institution does not have 
the power to extinguish the protection afforded to the representative’s leg-
islative agency. Therefore, non-accountability also entails an immunity-right 
in the strict Hohfeldian sense of the term. 
A liberty-right is also correlated with the absence of a claim-right on the 
part of others. That is to say, an individual’s liberty-right to perform φ means 
that other individuals do not have a claim that she not perform φ. Thus, 
non-accountability will generate a rights-conflict when the representative’s 
liberty-right to φ is at odds with a claim-right of an ordinary citizen that she 
not φ. Thus, for example, a representative’s right to express any views before 
the assembly may conflict with a citizen’s right not to have her name as a 
suspect in a trial made public.7
An equivalent rights conflict will not arise in the case of parliamentary 
inviolability because the state has jurisdiction if the representative is caught 
in the commission of a crime, parliament consents, or she loses her parlia-
mentary mandate. With regard to her nonlegislative agency, the representative 
has a duty not to transgress the claim-right of an ordinary citizen (i.e. she 
lacks a liberty-right to act in way that will cause a transgression). Inviolabil-
ity only affects when that claim-right may be enforced by the state, and not 
whether it may be enforced. A statute of limitations typically does not apply 
to parliamentarians protected by inviolability and so that form of immunity 
is compatible with the vindication of the rights of victims. 
It is important to note that parliamentary immunity is only designed to 
shield the actions, words, and votes of representatives. Parliamentary im-
munity does not protect the legislative decisions that representatives reach 
as a result of that agency. Parliamentary immunity is fully consistent with the 
principle of checks and balances, which enables other branches of govern-
ment to assess the laws passed by parliament. Because it is compatible with 
constitutional constraints, we can see that parliamentary immunity does not 
render parliamentarians de legibus solutus (“not bound by the law”). Put 
differently, while a representative’s agency may not be subject to law that 
governs corruption, seditious libel, or other similar crimes without parlia-
mentary authorization, a representative’s decisions are subject to judicial 
review by the constitutional court. The underlying idea is that the courts 
should only be able to interfere with legislation after it is enacted. 
Limitations to parliamentary immunity, such as reducing the range of 
activities protected by inviolability, imply the expansion of judicial jurisdic-
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tion over elected representatives from constitutional law into criminal law. 
By contrast, if an elected representative is immune to criminal proceed-
ings, only parliament has jurisdiction over its members. One shortcoming 
of the growing literature on the judicialization of politics is that it focuses 
almost exclusively on the political influence of constitutional courts,8 and 
disregards the possibility of political influence via the criminal courts, par-
ticularly through charges of political corruption, seditious libel, or subversive 
advocacy against representatives. In other words, that literature has been 
primarily concerned with the constitutionalization of politics as opposed to 
the criminalization of politics. By considering the practice of immunizing 
elected representatives from criminal law this article hopes to redress that 
shortcoming.
III. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Democratic governance is associated with individual rights in at least three 
ways. First, some have argued that each individual should have a voice in 
the formation of laws and policies to which they are subject. This right is 
entrenched in various international human rights instruments9 and may be 
defended on the grounds that it accords with the classical republican idea 
that each individual is free to the extent that she is not subject to another’s 
will.10 It follows that individuals have a fundamental human right to demo-
cratic governance for the same reasons why individuals have a right to be 
free from slavery or serfdom. A second way that democratic governance is 
associated with individual rights is through the existence of many rights, 
including civil and political liberties, which are necessary preconditions for 
self-government. Finally, democratically elected assemblies may be more 
likely than non-elected authorities to identify and protect the basic interests 
of individuals. Thus, democracies may be more likely to protect human rights, 
such as the right to a fair trial, the right to be free from slavery or serfdom, 
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the right to security and subsistence, and the right to freedom of thought 
and expression, than their more autocratic counterparts.11 
A. The Case for Parliamentary Immunity
This article argues that the immunity of elected representatives is justified 
insofar as it advances the aforementioned connections between democracy 
and rights. To explain this position, this article firstly highlights the role par-
liamentary immunity might play in the self-governing process of consolidated 
democracies, where we assume that the rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens 
are adequately protected. This article then considers the positive role that 
parliamentary immunity can play in emerging or consolidating democracies, 
where the rights of ordinary citizens are not yet adequately protected.
In the case of consolidated democracies there are at least three related 
reasons why the courts should not have jurisdiction over the agency of elected 
representatives irrespective of the rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens.12 In 
the first place, jurisdiction in these matters may undermine the ability of 
representatives to perform their public function. That public function involves 
the formulation of laws and policies that those they represent would also 
formulate if they were just as competent and were able to spend the same 
amount of time considering the information and arguments presented to the 
assembly. According to this reading of the function of representation, elected 
representatives are independent in the sense that they are not required to 
follow the explicit instructions of those they represent. However, they are 
not independent in the sense that they may depart from how an ordinary 
citizen would participate in the assembly’s deliberations. Thus, the need for 
legal immunity exists because the views representatives express may justifi-
ably depart from popular sentiment or the interests of powerful lobbies and 
non-elected authorities. As a consequence, immunity protects the informing 
function of democratic assemblies because it fosters uninhibited speech and 
debate between representatives so that citizens are well-informed about a 
variety of legislative proposals and their merits.13
The second reason why courts should not have jurisdiction over the 
agency of elected representatives is that parliamentary immunity ensures a 
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separation among the different branches of government and a balance of 
power among those branches. Expanding the jurisdiction of the courts to 
include the criminality of legislative agency, rather than just the constitu-
tionality of legislative decisions only serves to overstate the influence of the 
judicial branch. In addition, parliamentary immunity means that members 
of the legislative branch can criticize or vote against the interests of the 
executive branch without fear of prosecution. 
Finally, exposing elected representatives to prosecution in the courts 
displaces the supervisory role of the public with oversight by an unelected 
authority. An important by-product of parliamentary immunity is that the 
electorate, rather than the courts, is responsible for scrutinizing the words 
and votes of representatives during parliamentary proceedings and their 
other activities. Each representative remains vulnerable to public criticism 
as well as the prospect of being voted out of office. Furthermore, parliament 
as a whole is also subject to electoral accountability for the way in which it 
handles each request to waive the inviolability of one of its members. 
Unsurprisingly, the protection afforded by parliamentary inviolability has 
come under the most criticism.14 However, there are two reasons to protect 
the nonlegislative agency of elected representatives. First, the primary func-
tion of this protection is to prevent indirect intimidation of their legislative 
agency. An outside authority that is determined to influence parliamentary 
decision-making can do so by prosecuting or threatening to prosecute the 
nonlegislative agency of parliamentarians. Therefore, the aim of inviolabil-
ity is to grant parliament the ability to prevent court proceedings when the 
charges brought against one of its members are politically motivated. A 
second reason that supports inviolability is that a subset of each representa-
tive’s nonlegislative agency (e.g. communications with constituents, televi-
sion interviews, political rallies, and so on) should be protected because it 
is integral to their public function. 
In the preceding paragraphs, this article addressed the reasons for par-
liamentary immunity in consolidated democracies. This article now turns 
to the reasons for parliamentary immunity in countries that are undergoing 
transition away from authoritarian rule or in the process of consolidating their 
democratic credentials. There is a stronger case for protecting parliamentar-
ians in emerging or consolidating democracies because the existing body of 
law, or those who enforce it, are typically the product of an authoritarian 
past. According to that view, authoritarian rule is self-perpetuating as long 
as elected representatives may be prosecuted for publicly questioning non-
elected authorities or attempting to legislate in order to bring them under 
civilian control. Parliamentary immunity, on the other hand, enables a forum 
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in which unfettered communication can take place even when free speech 
in the polity at large is insufficiently protected. Immunity also facilitates the 
passage of legislation designed to ensure that free speech, along with other 
basic rights, such as the right to a fair trial or the right to subsistence, receives 
adequate protection. Parliamentary immunity, therefore, can compensate for 
any shortcoming in the set of rights that are preconditions for democratic 
rule (e.g. civil and political liberties) and protect law-making that is designed 
to rectify that shortcoming. Equally, it protects legislation that enables the 
realization of other human rights, such as the right to subsistence. Finally, 
the greater vulnerability of representatives in democratizing countries to legal 
intimidation also suggests that there is even more of a reason to expand the 
immunity so as to include parliamentary inviolability. 
The justification for parliamentary immunity derives from the fact that it 
safeguards the ability of representatives to improve the rights of those they 
represent. In order to safeguard that ability, it is often necessary to shield the 
actual representative from becoming the victim of human rights violations.15 
In such cases the immunity will protect the representative’s public function 
and, incidentally, the representative themselves. 
b. THE CASE AGAINST PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY 
In the previous section this article argued that shielding representatives from 
criminal law is justified to the extent that it enables protection of those 
individual rights that are necessary for self-government, compensates for 
a shortfall in those rights, or protects the passage of pro-rights legislation. 
However, it is possible that parliamentary immunity may serve to protect 
a parliamentary majority that aims to restrict individual rights by censoring 
speech that is interpreted as blasphemous. It is also possible that members 
of parliament may use their immunity to introduce non-democratic rule by, 
for example, establishing a theocracy. These possibilities arise in the context 
of political movements that are intent on using democratic procedures to 
subvert self-government. The rise to power of Hitler’s Nazi party and the 
electoral success of the anti-democratic Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria 
in 1992 are examples.16 A potential problem with parliamentary immunity, 
therefore, is that it can protect speech and actions that are used to support 
illiberal and anti-democratic legislation. 
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A further challenge to parliamentary immunity is that it can be used to 
protect rights violations committed by a parliamentarian prior to, or during, 
their electoral mandate. Some parliamentarians may use the immunity to 
avoid prosecution for perpetration of human rights abuses. It is important, 
however, to distinguish parliamentary immunity from the immunity that 
former authoritarian rulers grant themselves before ceding power. The lat-
ter form of retroactive immunity, as seen in the example of former Chilean 
dictator Augusto Pinochet’s status as “senator for life,”17 may be necessary 
in order to entice authoritarian rulers to vacate power. Parliamentary im-
munity, on the other hand, is only meant to protect the public function of 
elected representatives. As a result, it is not granted ex post facto and it only 
holds while a person retains an electoral mandate. Parliamentary immunity, 
therefore, only poses a problem for transitional justice if, and for as long as, 
former members of the regime manage to become elected. However, as we 
saw in Section II, a rights violation that resulted from a non-legislative act 
can be prosecuted if the accused is caught in the act, parliament consents, 
or they are not re-elected. It remains the case however, that a parliamentar-
ian can use the protection afforded by non-accountability to incite others 
to commit rights violations. 
Another argument against parliamentary immunity is that the absence 
of the threat of punishment will entice elected representatives to act based 
on corrupt incentives.18 As a result representatives may fail to consider each 
policy or legislative proposal based on substantive merit. Thus, the public 
function of elected representatives will be compromised. In addition, if the 
corrupt incentives do not encourage reforms, then the process of democra-
tization will be threatened.
A final argument against immunity is that it contravenes the principle 
that individuals should not be judges in their own cases (nemo iudex in 
causa sua). The effect of parliamentary immunity is that only parliament 
has jurisdiction over the legislative agency of its members. Moreover, in 
those countries that have parliamentary inviolability, the authorization of 
parliament is required before one of its members may be prosecuted in the 
criminal courts for nonlegislative activity. The concern is that parliament as 
a whole will protect its individual members or be more willing to expose 
members from less powerful parties to the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus, 
the self-jurisdiction created by parliamentary immunity is at odds with the 
idea that criminal charges should be dealt with by a third party who does not 
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have a vested interest in the outcome of the case. Moreover, parliamentary 
self-protection can delay the prosecution of those elected representatives 
who are accused of rights-violations or political corruption. 
This article next examines these challenges to parliamentary immunity 
within the context of Turkey, a country where democratic governance is not 
yet sufficiently institutionalized. Before discussing each challenge this article 
first explains why Turkey represents a particularly useful case for examin-
ing the issue, and then discusses the scope of parliamentary immunity in 
Turkey. 
IV. THE TURkISH CASE
Turkey serves as an illuminating case study of the impact of parliamentary 
immunity in democratizing countries for two competing reasons. First, the 
inadequacy of the rights afforded to ordinary citizens and the continued 
influence of the military-led state elite provides a reason not to criminalize 
politics. On the other hand, the possibility that Turkish parliamentarians will 
pursue private gain, advocate Kurdish secessionism, or re-install an Islamic 
political order provides a reason to criminalize politics. 
A. Authoritarian Self-protection
Since the creation of the Turkish republic out of the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1923, the military, in concert with the secular elite 
that pervades state institutions, including the judiciary, the presidency, the 
foreign ministry, and academia, has exerted a considerable degree of in-
fluence over the political process. Following in a tradition that dates back 
to the Ottoman period,19 the “center” of Turkish politics (“state elite”) has 
construed its overriding calling to be that of ensuring the well-being of the 
state in the face of the particularistic and short-term interests of those groups 
on the “periphery”—namely, the vast majority of the population who are 
conservative and of rural origin.20 
The persistence of that state-centered tradition means that: (1) nonelected 
authorities, such as the military and judiciary, retain a significant degree of 
influence over politics; and (2) individual rights are not yet adequately pro-
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tected. Consequently, parliamentary immunity may be necessary in Turkey 
because the protections parliamentary representatives enjoy as ordinary 
citizens are not sufficient to protect members of a reformist-minded parlia-
ment from suppression or intimidation by a military-led establishment that 
is eager to preserve its guardianship role. 
1. The Military as Guardians 
As heirs of the state-centered tradition the military-led state elite has played 
a preeminent role in defining the guiding principles of the republic and 
controlling the process of democratic change. Thus, the transition to mul-
tiparty politics that took place towards the end of the 1940’s was initiated 
and controlled by the leaders of the pre-existing authoritarian regime. That 
regime namely consisted of the single-party rule of the Republican People’s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), which had governed Turkey between 
1925 and 1946. Moreover, since the inception of genuinely competitive 
elections in 1950 there has been a military intervention in 1960, 1971, 
and 1980. In each case there was a relatively rapid return to civilian rule, 
suggesting the military was primarily interested in controlling rather than 
replacing democratic rule.21 Thus, as is the case with Brazil and Spain, Turkey 
represents a clear-cut example of democratization initiated and controlled 
by the authoritarian regime.22 As a result, Turkey has struggled to establish a 
stable democratic order because the design of institutions has been a product 
of top-down political engineering, rather than a compromise between state 
elites and political representatives of the periphery (“political elites”).23 
In virtue of its proactive role in the democratization process, the military 
retains a significant degree of autonomy from elected officials as well as 
various tutelary powers.24 In particular, by introducing the National Security 
Council (composed of senior members of the armed forces, the president, 
the prime minister, and senior members of the cabinet) in the 1961 and 
1982 post-coup constitutions, the military granted itself the legal and insti-
tutionalized means to influence the formation of law and policy. Until the 
recent reforms, the cabinet was required to give priority to the decisions of 
the National Security Council concerning matters of external and internal 
security. Most notably, the pressure applied by the military during the 28 
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February 1997 meeting of the National Security Council contributed signifi-
cantly to the military’s campaign to oust the coalition government, co-led 
by the pro-Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) and the center-right True 
Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP), from office.25
The military’s role is paradoxical given that it aspires to bring about a 
Western-style secular democracy in Turkey, while still retaining the ability 
to influence the democratic process when it so wishes. The military does 
so through its tutelary powers, reserve domains, and the credible threat 
of intervention. Thus, while the military may have helped to facilitate the 
initial transition to democracy in Turkey, its continued influence over, and 
independence from, elected civilian authorities is an obstacle to the process 
of democratic consolidation.26
2. Rights protection
The overriding concern of the ruling elite during and since the Ottoman 
period has been to preserve the state, rather than to protect the individual.27 
Consequently, the political elite cannot rely on a tradition of individual rights 
to challenge legislation made by the center. Thus, the Turkish legal tradition 
places much greater emphasis on the top-down exertion of power than on 
the bottom-up protection of rights. Indeed, the European Union’s Commis-
sion for Enlargement continues to raise concerns about the impartiality of 
the judiciary and the protection of human rights in Turkey.28 
Although the judiciary in Turkey is now institutionally independent from 
the military,29 it clearly shares the military’s statist agenda and concomitant 
distrust of political representatives. Article 301 of the criminal code is a 
clear example of the state-entered tradition in Turkey. That provision enables 
the prosecution of individuals for insulting or deriding “Turkishness,” the 
republic, or the organs and institutions of the state.30 Based on Article 301 
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(and its predecessor Article 159) a significant number of journalists, academ-
ics, publishers, writers, and human rights activists have been prosecuted 
for, among other things, labeling those who defend secularism as atheists, 
defaming the military or the judiciary, and expressing an unwelcome opin-
ion about Armenian and Kurdish issues.31 Article 301 enables the courts to 
prosecute an individual’s speech without considering whether it was intended 
to incite violence, armed rebellion, or enmity. Nor does Article 301 require 
the courts to consider the speaker’s capacity to influence members of the 
public to act accordingly. 
b. Unbridled Particularism 
What the discussion in the preceding section suggests is that there is a case 
for not circumscribing parliamentary immunity because, although there 
have been regular and competitive elections for more than half a century, 
the military-led state elite retains the means to prosecute reformist-minded 
parliamentarians. At the same time, the allegation that the political elite are 
only interested in pursuing their personal and political ends suggests that the 
immunity should be abrogated. Indeed there is a widespread public percep-
tion that political corruption is rife in Turkey.32 In addition, members of the 
state elite will argue that parliamentary immunity protects law-making that 
is designed to bring about Kurdish self-determination or the re-introduction 
of an Islamic political order. 
Absent parliamentary immunity, the state elite is concerned by the for-
mer case because pro-Kurdish political parties can use forums such as the 
assembly and the media to rally public support in favor of autonomy for 
the predominantly Kurdish southeast of the country. The state establishment 
has been engaged in an armed conflict with Kurdish secessionists (Workers’ 
Party of Kurdistan, Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of the 
country since the early 1980s. It is estimated that over 36,000 people have 
died during that prolonged conflict.33 It is by no means clear, however, that 
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the pursuit of some form of self-determination by purely non-violent means 
should be prohibited. If that is correct, then the immunity only presents a 
genuine problem if it is used by representatives to protect the advocacy of 
violent means to pursue self-determination. 
The fear in the case of pro-Islamic political parties is that in an over-
whelmingly Muslim country the popular majority may be persuaded that 
Islam is inconsistent with: (1) democratic government because the basic 
laws are already preordained in the Koran; and (2) the separation between 
religion and state because the Prophet Mohammed conflated spiritual and 
temporal authority.34 Since the inception of the republic, the state elite in 
Turkey has endeavored to institutionalize a laicist reading of secularism, 
whereby religion is relegated to the private sphere and, in keeping with the 
statist tradition, the state controls religious practice (this includes the ap-
pointment of prayer leaders and preachers, the monitoring of sermons and 
the regulation of the content of religious classes taught in schools, and the 
banning of some independent religious orders). The underlying concern of 
the secular establishment in this case is not necessarily that Islam is incom-
patible with a constitutional democracy,35 but rather that Islamic political 
parties may successfully promote the view that a genuinely Islamic society 
requires theocratic rule.36 If that were to occur then parliamentary immunity 
would have protected electoral mobilization and law-making that reduces, 
rather than expands, democratic rights.
V. THE TURkISH IMMUNITY AND DEMoCRATIC REFoRM 
In Turkey it is widely assumed that parliamentary immunity is broader than 
the immunity that is enjoyed by representatives in other democracies. That 
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assumption exists in spite of the fact that Turkey’s inclusion of inviolability 
alongside non-accountability is in line with how parliamentary immunity is 
practiced by the majority of the world’s representative assemblies.37 In reality, 
parliamentary immunity in Turkey is narrower than in most countries. For 
example, it does not encompass those cases where an investigation based 
on Article 14 of the constitution is initiated against a deputy before their 
election.38 In those cases the courts do not require parliamentary authori-
zation to continue proceedings. Article 14 is a notoriously vague catchall 
that can be used by members of the state elite to prosecute activities that 
are interpreted as posing a threat to the secular, indivisible, and democratic 
character of the Turkish state.39 That qualification of parliamentary immunity 
is in keeping with the illiberal character of the current constitution. That 
constitution, which was formulated in the wake of the 1980 coup, guarantees 
individual civil and political liberties, but only insofar as individual actions 
do not contravene Article 14. 
Another limitation on immunity comes from the authority of the Turkish 
Constitutional Court (TCC). The TCC can circumvent parliamentary immunity 
by closing a political party if it is interpreted as a threat to the indivisible, 
secular and democratic character of the Turkish state.40 Furthermore, the 
court may ban from politics those deputies whose words and deeds are 
interpreted as having caused the dissolution of the party.41 As a result of 
losing parliamentary status, the non-legislative agency of those deputies is 
susceptible to prosecution. Indeed, the TCC has dissolved eighteen politi-
cal parties since 1980, most of them pro-Kurdish or religiously orientated.42 
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Moreover, the TCC has used the legislative agency of deputies as evidence 
in support of dissolution. For example, the TCC dissolved the pro-Islamic RP 
in 1998 on the grounds that it advocated for the installation of an Islamic 
political order.43 While the closure may have been warranted, the decision 
was tarnished by the fact that the TCC relied on three instances of legisla-
tive agency in addition to eight instances of non-legislative agency. The TCC 
argued that non-accountability does not pertain in such cases because it is 
the party and not the deputy that is being subjected to legal scrutiny. That 
sleight of hand in effect amounts to an encroachment on parliamentary 
immunity. Given the prospect of party closure and exposure to criminal 
prosecution of those members who are banned from politics, deputies will 
think twice before expressing themselves in parliament. 
Because democratization in Turkey has been dominated by non-elected 
authorities, it is necessary to examine whether the protection afforded by 
parliamentary immunity might help to correct the marginalization of the 
political elite from the process of institutional design-making. The reforms 
implemented by the religiously-orientated Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partısı, AKP), a successor of RP, provide a good example 
of such a possibility. In the first three years following its landslide electoral 
victory in November 2002, AKP enacted a number of groundbreaking legal 
and political reforms aimed at improving Turkey’s ability to accede to the 
European Union (EU). The AKP overhauled the penal code, converted the 
National Security Council from an executive organ into an advisory body 
composed primarily of civilians, and increased civilian oversight of military 
spending.44 During the first years of AKP’s tenure the EU accession process 
appeared to provide a basis for mutual accommodation between state and 
political elites. The military would have been cognizant of the fact that 
the EU would not accept anything approaching an Islamic political order, 
while, for its part, the AKP would have been cognizant of the fact that the 
EU would not accept the absence of civilian superiority. Nevertheless, given 
the number of criminal cases that public prosecutors brought against senior 
members of AKP before they were elected into office (indeed its leader, 
Tayyip Erdoğan, was imprisoned for four months in 1999 for inciting religious 
enmity during a speech that he had delivered two years previously), it is 
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by no means clear that, albeit unstable, modus vivendi between the state 
and political elites would have emerged without the protection afforded by 
parliamentary immunity. 
VI. FoUR CHALLENGES To PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
As noted in Section III, there are four important arguments for criminalizing 
the legislative or non-legislative agency of elected representatives in those 
countries that are undergoing democratization: (1) subversive advocacy; (2) 
rights violations; (3) political corruption; and (4) parliamentary self-protec-
tion. This article now specifically evaluates the merits of those arguments 
for abrogating immunity based on the Turkish case. This article argues that 
measures other than the criminalizing of politics should be used to address 
those four problems in democratizing countries.
A. Subversive Advocacy 
The first problem presented by parliamentary immunity is that antidemo-
cratic political parties can use immunity to protect lawmaking that restricts 
individual rights and subverts the democratic order. In Turkey, for example, 
the secular establishment fears that Islamic political parties might conceal 
their fundamentalist intentions until the moment is right to unveil them 
(taqiyyah, or expedient dissimulation). By way of illustration consider the 
following case. On 13 April 1994, Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of Turkey’s 
pro-Islamic RP, delivered the following speech to a meeting of his party 
within parliament. 
Refah Party will come to power and a just [social] order (adil düzen) will be 
established. The question we must ask ourselves is whether this change will be 
violent or peaceful; whether it will entail bloodshed  . . .  Today Turkey must 
take a decision. The Refah Party will establish a just order, that is certain. But 
will the transition be peaceful or violent; will it be achieved harmoniously or 
by bloodshed? The 60 million [Turkish citizens] must make up their minds on 
that point.45
Parliamentary immunity protected that speech as well as other provocative 
statements by fellow members of the party. After the national elections of 
1995, RP became the largest party in parliament and a year later it formed 
a coalition government with the center-right DYP. In 1998 Turkey’s pro-
establishment constitutional court dissolved the party on the grounds that it 
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attempted to replace the democratic political order with a religious political 
order.46 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) subsequently upheld 
that decision.47 The ECHR found that the dissolution of RP was justified on 
the grounds that democratic freedoms enshrined in the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights may not be used to install a nondemocratic order 
and that RP both advocated a regime based on Shari’a and had the real 
potential to bring it about.48 
Some evidence supports the argument that AKP, in keeping with its 
predecessor RP, is using democratic freedoms, such as parliamentary im-
munity, to reinstall religion into the public sphere. Indeed, some of AKP’s 
proposed legislation—namely its ongoing attempts to lift the ban on wearing 
headscarves in public institutions, ensure equal weighting for graduates of 
prayer leader and preacher schools in the national university entrance exam, 
and introduce a law against adultery—do have a distinctly religious tinge to 
them.49 In addition, the AKP government has used illiberal elements of the 
state-centered legacy when it suits its own interests. In 2003, for example, 
the AKP-controlled justice ministry gave permission to investigate Young 
Party (Genc Parti) leader Cem Uzan, who was not an elected member of 
parliament, based on the Article 159 criminal offense (the predecessor to 
Article 301) of insulting the office of the prime minister. After the investiga-
tion, Uzan was sentenced to eight months in prison.50 It remains possible, 
therefore, that AKP’s aim is not to dismantle the state-centered tradition by 
expanding and entrenching the protection of individual rights, but rather to 
supplant the secular elite as the heirs of that tradition. 
As we have seen, however, parliamentary immunity only protects the 
actions, words, and votes of representatives and not the legislative decisions 
they reach as a result of that agency. In other words, legislative decisions 
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remain subject to constitutional constraints such as judicial review and presi-
dential veto. Indeed, in the Turkish case, parliament is not supreme insofar 
as laws are subject to the possibility of presidential veto (although the veto 
can be circumvented if parliament returns the bill unchanged) and judicial 
review by the constitutional court. It is not immediately obvious, therefore, 
that democracies undergoing transition or consolidation need to criminal-
ize the agency of representatives in order to prevent attempts to install a 
non-democratic order. The case for abrogating immunity, then, arises when 
subversive legislators garner enough votes to override decision-checks by 
the other branches. In addition to parliamentary majorities that subvert the 
system of checks and balances, it is important to acknowledge that political 
parties can also use parliamentary immunity to protect speech that mobilizes 
electoral support in favor of illiberal or anti-democratic legislation. 
Even if the possibility of over-riding checks and balances is serious, 
however, it may not be necessary to abrogate parliamentary immunity be-
cause the constitutional court has the power to dissolve political parties as a 
countermajoritarian measure of last resort. Indeed, the international trend is 
to dissolve anti-democratic political parties when it is necessary to preserve 
democratic rule.51 The obvious problem with that proposal is that a conserva-
tive constitutional court could shut down reformist parties. The constitutional 
court in Turkey is a case in point. Insulated from the political branches, the 
court has zealously used its powers of judicial review and party closure to 
guard the secular and indivisible character of the state.52 In order to ensure 
that the powers of review and closure do not become another means to 
obstruct democratic reform, it is vital that members of the constitutional 
court are not recruited solely from within the judiciary, and that parliament 
has a nontrivial role in deciding appointments to the court.53 
b. Rights Violations
The second challenge to parliamentary immunity is that it will shield indi-
vidual parliamentarians from prosecution for human rights abuses. Perhaps 
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the clearest example of such a possibility in Turkey is provided by the so-
called Susurluk scandal. In 1997 the public prosecutor requested that parlia-
ment lift the immunity of Mehmet Ağar and Sedat Bucak for forming a gang 
with criminal intent and helping a fugitive to evade the law, amongst other 
charges. The prevailing view is that both parliamentarians used nationalist 
gang members to assassinate pro-Kurdish activists.54 However, even when 
parliament lifted their immunity they regained it by being elected in the 
subsequent elections. Thus, it was not until they eventually failed to be re-
elected (in 2008 and 2002 respectively) that court proceedings against them 
commenced. The Susurluk case illustrates that parliamentary inviolability 
does not preclude the possibility of prosecuting rights-violations, but rather 
that the accused can (if not caught during the commission of a crime)55 
delay court proceedings for as long as they can garner enough assembly or 
electoral support. This problem is further addressed in section D below.
C. Political Corruption
A further challenge to parliamentary immunity stems from the view that 
vulnerability to ordinary law is the only effective way to deter politicians 
from engaging in corrupt activities.56 The underlying concern in this case may 
be that politicians are not sufficiently accountable to the electorate, rather 
than simply that they are prone to behave corruptly. Party leaders in Turkey, 
for example, typically select electoral candidates with no grassroots support 
in order to ensure that his or her control over the party is not threatened.57 
Legal accountability, therefore, may be seen as a way to compensate for 
a lack of electoral accountability. If this is true, however, the first priority 
should be to revise the electoral and party system (for example, by improv-
ing intra-party democracy), rather than to allow the courts to supplant the 
supervisory role of the electorate. Moreover, as we have seen, one of the 
reasons for parliamentary immunity is that the decision-making of elected 
representatives may on occasion legitimately depart from the express wishes 
of the electorate.58
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The problem with abrogating immunity to combat corruption is that it 
will expose parliamentarians to the possibility of vexatious charges by the 
institutional remnants of authoritarianism. This would still be the case even 
if the immunity was only modified so that inviolability did not cover cor-
ruption offenses. A partial judiciary can intimidate the legislative agency of 
parliamentarians by prosecuting non-legislative behavior that is interpreted 
as corrupt. Moreover, corrupt representatives do not necessarily threaten 
democraticization. Rather, corruption may help to facilitate that process 
because the hitherto excluded nouveau riche can buy themselves access.59 
Even if political corruption does impede democratization, the overriding 
need to protect the agency of parliamentarians requires that alternative, and 
potentially more effective, methods should be used to counter corrupt influ-
ences. Examples of these alternatives include reforms to campaign financing, 
public procurement, and limiting the spoils of office by reducing the size 
of state sector. A further tactic would be to modify the way parliamentary 
immunity is implemented, without actually limiting the scope of its protec-
tion. The next section discusses how that might be achieved in the case of 
parliamentary inviolability.
D. Parliamentary Self-Protection
The final challenge to parliamentary immunity is that parliamentary self-
jurisdiction contravenes the principle that individuals should not judge 
themselves. Moreover, as described above, parliamentary self-protection 
may endlessly postpone the prosecution of those parliamentarians who are 
accused of rights violations or political corruption. That problem is par-
ticularly acute in the case of parliamentary inviolability because governing 
parties will not lift a member’s immunity if it threatens their parliamentary 
majority, or if they can obtain a crucial vote in exchange for not doing so. 
The extremely low ratio of immunity waivers to prosecution requests in 
Turkey, for example, suggests that Turkish parliamentarians are too reluctant 
to expose their colleagues to the law.60 Between October 1961 and March 
1998 parliament received 2,713 written requests from prosecutors for the 
suspension of parliamentary immunity for 1,151 of its members. Between 
the first session of the national assembly in 1920 and March 1998, however, 
only twenty-nine deputies have had their immunity waived.61 It is difficult to 
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discern from these statistics whether prosecutors are overzealous, whether 
the penal code is overly intrusive, or whether parliament is over-protective 
of its own members. In other words, the nemo iudex principle does not 
provide sufficient reason for abrogating parliamentary immunity when the 
effect of doing so would be to expose parliamentarians to a judiciary that 
has a vested interest in the outcome of political cases.62
In those countries where the interests of the judiciary and parliament are 
historically at odds, the number of waiver requests submitted to parliament 
will not provide a reliable guide as to the extent of malfeasance amongst 
politicians.63 Similarly, the level of parliamentary self-protection—the ratio 
of waivers to waiver requests—in each country will correlate with the extent 
to which the law and judiciary retain traces of the authoritarian past. Thus, 
the incidence of parliamentary self-protection should decrease as steps are 
taken to remove illiberal laws, improve judicial process, and rectify any 
residual bias amongst the judiciary. Under those circumstances prosecutors 
should be less likely to submit a waiver request, and parliament should be 
less fearful of lifting the parliamentary immunity of one of its members. 
Nevertheless, in each country the authorization process to lift the im-
munity can be revised to mitigate self-protection by the ruling majority. 
First, to prevent the parliament from deliberately stalling the authorization 
process, an explicit time limit might be placed on the length of parliament’s 
deliberations for each waiver request. Second, those parliamentarians whose 
immunity has been waived, should not regain their immunity by virtue of 
re-election. In those cases, court proceedings should continue uninterrupted 
unless parliament votes to suspend them. Crucially, these proposals reform 
the way parliamentary immunity is implemented without actually narrowing 
the range of activities that fall under its protection.
The reverse problem with authorization is that it may lead to the under-
protection of those parliamentarians who are not members of the ruling 
majority. In 1994, for example, the Turkish parliament lifted the immunity of 
all seven deputies from the pro-Kurdish Democratic Party (Demokrasi Partisi, 
DEP). Four of them were subsequently sentenced to fifteen years imprison-
ment on the grounds that they belonged to the PKK.64 When the European 
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Court of Human Rights reviewed the case it found that they were not tried 
by an independent and impartial court and that their rights of defense were 
inadequately safeguarded.65 
If anything, such cases only serve to strengthen the argument for pro-
tecting the agency of parliamentarians. Aside from reforming the law and 
judiciary it is difficult to see how the greater vulnerability of representatives 
from smaller opposition parties can be mitigated. The right of Turkish deputies 
whose immunity is lifted by parliament to seek review by the constitutional 
courts—a right which appears to be unique to Turkey and Austria66—might 
counter the problem of under-protection. Clearly, it would not mitigate the 
problem if the constitutional court is institutionally independent and partial. 
In the case of the seven DEP deputies, for example, such an appeal was 
rendered redundant by the fact that the TCC dissolved the party shortly 
after parliament voted to lift their immunity. The European Court of Human 
Rights subsequently ruled that the TCC’s decision violated their right to be 
elected and sit in parliament, and also violated the sovereign power of the 
electorate that voted for them.67 
VII. CoNCLUSIoN
This article argued that that parliamentary immunity should not be cir-
cumscribed in emerging or consolidating democracies until the vestiges of 
authoritarianism have been removed from the law and judiciary. Immunity 
from criminal prosecution enhances the ability of elected representatives 
to act on behalf of those they represent when the latter are insufficiently 
protected by civil and political rights. In addition, it means that illiberal 
elements of the extant body of law cannot be used to hamper efforts by a 
reformist parliament to improve human rights and bring non-elected authori-
ties under civilian control. Thus, parliamentary immunity helps to compensate 
for any shortfall in the democratic rights enjoyed by ordinary citizens and 
provides elected representatives with the protection necessary to rectify that 
shortfall. Nevertheless, in each democratizing country there will typically be 
considerable pressure to criminalize politics—say by removing the protection 
afforded to non-legislative agency by parliamentary inviolability—due to the 
threat posed by subversive advocacy, the perpetration of rights-violations by 
parliamentarians, or the perception that political corruption is pervasive. 
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Turkey provides a particularly illuminating case study of those challenges to 
parliamentary immunity. By drawing on the Turkish experience this article 
argued that it is not necessary to criminalize the actions, words, and votes 
of parliamentarians in order to tackle those problems. 
